

Nearly everything written about music—and art in general—within the field of philosophy has been insufficient for the main reason that it has been written by philosophers and not artists. At the same time, the artist himself rarely is able to articulate the profundity of his craft. Since ancient Greece, philosophers and artists have engaged in a battle for mutual recognition. Plato and Aristotle both inquired into the nature of art, but, unfortunately for artists, Socrates banned the poets from his *Republic*, solidifying the superfluity of art for centuries. As philosophy diverged from its Greek origins, what we now call “art” progressively became a decidedly *un-*philosophical topic. Ironically, it was not until Modernity reached its systematic apex in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant that the subject of art was again explored. With his work, *The Critique of Pure Judgment* (1790), Kant founded a new era of Aesthetics, and for more than two hundred years it has been vogue to speculate about the nature of the work of art.

The Aesthetic exploration inaugurated by Kant, however, took a turn with the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. He made his philosophical debut with *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), which included his own innovative thoughts about Aesthetics. Nietzsche not only included his interpretations on the essence of art in his philosophy, which could have been found in any philosopher’s career since Kant, but he altered the future course of Aesthetics when he radically equated truth and art in a way that no philosopher had ever dared. For Nietzsche, art infused existence with a purpose—to create the beautiful. His contribution to philosophy cannot be understated, and it was through his influence that a new era of necessary reevaluation began in philosophy. Most are aware of the fate of the great thinker Friedrich Nietzsche and his eventual mental decline. It was in the year 1889 that he was first admitted into a hospital for his mental illness, and he died in 1900.

The same year that Nietzsche's mental faculties finally left him, Martin Heidegger, who would come to found his own philosophical methodology, was born in the rural town of Baden, Germany. With his magnum opus, *Sein und Zeit* (translated *Being and Time* in 1962)—first published in 1927—he would revolutionize philosophy's understanding of "being" and, like Nietzsche, inspire a new generation of philosophers. His work on art, which he called *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (translated *The Origin of the Work of Art* in 1956), explains his ontological, non-Aesthetic interpretation of the work of art that changed the face of "Aesthetic" philosophy forever. Art, for Heidegger, is more than pleasurable; it is a *happening of truth*—a revelation of Being. All of this will be unpacked in detail.

The proceeding essay is an exploratory inquiry into the nature of music by means of Martin Heidegger's *The Origin of the Work of Art*. The first section will introduce the reader to the work, while the second will take a critical look at music as a particular art form and Heidegger's treatment thereof. Finally, some closing remarks about the future of music and its role in contemporary society will be made.

## I. Origin of the Work of Art

Martin Heidegger was one of the most provocative philosophers of the twentieth-century. His legacy for some, however, is regretfully tainted by his unapologetic involvement with Nazism and Hitler's Third Reich, which lasted until the very end of the regime. Philosophically speaking, though, he was a revolutionary thinker whose insights into Being paved the way for a new understanding of reality and the ways in which we encounter the world. Heidegger is generally considered an "Existentialist," which puts him in the company of an eclectic group that includes such philosophers as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Heidegger, however, vehemently

opposed this description of his philosophy. He considered it a misnomer, in part, because of the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, who defined Existentialism as a philosophy that analyzes “existence before [or over] essence.” Walter Kaufman takes this opposition rather lightly, since it seems that one of the defining characteristics of the “Existentialists” is their loathing for classification and a “marked aversion for each other.”<sup>1</sup>

Martin Heidegger was educated in the Phenomenological tradition but considered himself as first, last, and always an Ontologist. He described his entire philosophical project as a “quest for Being,” which he distinguished from Metaphysics in the introduction to *Being and Time*. He explained that while Metaphysics is an inquiry “beyond beings” (*meta-*, from the Greek word for “after” or “beyond”), Ontology was the study of Being in itself (*onto-* is the Greek word “being”). According to Heidegger, our everyday confrontation with reality is full of interactions with real beings. Whereas Metaphysics exceeds the scope of an authentic philosophy, Ontology and Phenomenology, “characterize philosophy itself, its object and procedure.”<sup>2</sup>

Martin Heidegger began his studies at twenty as a seminarian in Freiburg, Germany.<sup>3</sup> While at the University he encountered a work by Edmund Husserl called *The Logical Investigations*, which he continually renewed from the school’s library. After four semester of theological studies and numerous readings of the *Logical Investigations*, Heidegger decided to discontinue his theological studies and pursue philosophy fulltime. Several years after leaving the seminary, Husserl succeeded Heidegger’s former teacher, Heinrich Rickert, at Freiburg, and the young Heidegger took advantage of the opportunity to study Phenomenology from his philosophical mentor. In 1923 he became a professor at Marburg but was denied the chief philosophical chair a little later because he had yet to publish a book. *Being and Time* finally hit the press in 1927, and a year later Heidegger accepted a prestigious post at Freiburg. In 1933 he

was appointed *Rektor* of Freiburg, which made him the spiritual consultant to the Third Reich. In his inaugural speech, he encouraged Germany to “move itself into the primordial realm of the powers of Being, with the Nazi party in the vanguard.”<sup>4</sup> He remained in the high offices of the National Socialist Party through the end of the war, never apologized for his nefarious conduct up to his death in 1976, and so continues to have a bittersweet legacy.

### *Historical Context*

Many philosophers were surprised in 1935 when Martin Heidegger, *Rektor* of Freiburg and cabinet member of the Nazi party, announced that he would be lecturing on the topic of art. The subject did not seem to follow from his previous explorations and his overall ontological thought-project. Here, it might be helpful to offer a few words concerning his first work. In *Being and Time* Heidegger based his fundamental Ontology on Aristotle’s distinction between the two types of active life: the activity of living well, *phronêsis* in Greek, and the activity of production, *poiêsis*.<sup>5</sup> Aristotle’s most widely known work is the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is concerned with *phronêsis*, or ethical living. In it he subordinated the activity of the artist and craftsman (*poiêsis*) to the common activity of every human being, the attainment of happiness through living virtuously (*phronêsis*). In *Being and Time* Heidegger further explains that *Dasein*, his particular hallmark term for human nature, is always in a conflict between two poles, namely the Inauthentic and Authentic, which correspond to *poiêsis* and *phronêsis* respectively.

Emerging from this curious atmosphere, the lectures that would eventually become *The Origin of the Work of Art* incited what Hans-Georg Gadamer called a “philosophical sensation.”<sup>6</sup> But, what prompted Heidegger to embark on this creative exploration of the work of art, which seemed superfluous to his contemporaries, and even contrary to his entire philosophical project represented in *Being and Time*? It is interesting to note that *Being and Time* mentions the word

“art” only once in its pages, and, furthermore, Heidegger did not even bother to include it in the extensive index included in its subsequent printings.<sup>7</sup> What resulted from this inquiry into the nature of art by Martin Heidegger was a completely new understanding of art as an ontological experience. In the wake of Heidegger’s *Origin*, the work of art could no longer be considered simply a delight for the senses; his revolutionary understanding of art changed the field of Aesthetic philosophy by elevating the work to an experience of unveiled Being, which is related to his radical conception of truth.

### *A Return to Being*

Heidegger, if he wished to posit an *Ontological* understanding of art, needed first to rescue *poiêsis*, the activity of the artist, from the realm of the Inauthentic *Dasein* as posited in *Being and Time*. In order to remain faithful to his entire philosophical project, he needed to change how philosophy viewed the poet and artist, since their legacy from Plato was not a complimentary one.

To those self-assured philosophers of the Modern era, even the title, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, seemed indulgent and ridiculous. Is it not the true that in every work of art the artist is the origin? Artists produce art—an undeniable fact. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote some of the first lines to the contrary, condemning modern Aesthetics in his *Birth of Tragedy*. This very well could have sparked the creative interest of a young Heidegger who read much Nietzsche and even gave many lectures on the German philosopher, which are compiled in a two-volume work entitled *Nietzsche*. In his polemic against Aesthetics, Nietzsche posited that “all our knowledge of art is basically quite illusory.”<sup>8</sup> That the artist is not the originator of the work of art was controversial enough for its time, but Heidegger claimed that the work of art—and the artist himself—is put into being by Art itself: “Art is present within art.”<sup>9</sup>

Heidegger was arguably his most elegant in presenting his “fundamental Ontology” (i.e. *Dasein*) in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. The *Origin* also represented a culmination of a generation of German, Aesthetic undertakings. Immanuel Kant made it acceptable to entertain art as a philosophical inquiry again in 1790; Hegel positioned the work of art just below truth, since it is an expression thereof; and, finally, Nietzsche’s art usurped the primacy of truth, which he exemplified in the quote, “we possess *art*, lest we *perish of the truth*.”<sup>10</sup> But, all of these positions presuppose an exclusively *Aesthetic* interpretation of art, which will be elucidated later. The Aesthetic Ideal—the narrow conception of art solely as beauty-producing and pleasurable for the senses—organically exhausted itself in Nietzsche. Heidegger’s “quest for Being” challenged traditional philosophy in all areas, and his ideas concerning the nature of art were a perfect example of his radical views. It is worthy to note that delving beneath the surface of reality is the very essence of Phenomenology, which as a methodology seeks to find the foundations for everything that we experience (i.e. phenomena).

### *Overcoming Epistemology*

Heidegger’s major contribution to the world of philosophy was his understanding of truth, which he developed based on Franz Brentano’s exegesis of Aristotle. Heidegger’s principle thesis in the *Origin*, which was a continuation of his truth-analysis in *Being and Time*, was that the work of art is a *happening of truth*. In order to arrive at this notion he first had to dispel the countless incomplete or erroneous notions about art *and* truth. According to Heidegger, the only way truth happens—for truth is in actuality an event and not merely a description of reality—is by utilizing some *thing* as a vehicle: “Truth only works by installing itself into a particular being.”<sup>11</sup> He defined it in this way: truth is “the unconcealedness of that

which is as something that is.”<sup>12</sup> It must be admitted that this is a notion of “truth” that is quite foreign to most readers, but it was just as unfamiliar to all of philosophy prior to Heidegger. Furthermore, the understanding of art as truth-revealing is even *more* alien, and in some cases, it is entirely contrary to the popular theories surrounding the work of art.

Until Martin Heidegger’s revolution in Epistemology (the study of human knowing from the Greek *epistēmē* or “knowledge”), truth was solely the accurate portrayal of the current state of affairs. In philosophy this is called the “Correspondence Theory of Truth,” or propositional truth, and it traces its origins to Aristotle. In this variety of truth, it is up to the subject to conform his mind to the outside world (i.e. “reality”). While this is certainly a valid notion, it does not encompass the totality of truth, according to Heidegger. Propositional truth is shallow and incomplete and is itself based on a deeper understanding of beings. Heidegger acknowledged that to grasp this radical understanding of truth is difficult because of the prominence of “correctness.” He said that for one to overcome this, one must be willing to undergo a complete “transformation of thinking,” which involves a bold reevaluation of all prior philosophy.

### *Truth as Unveiling*

It was not uncommon for Heidegger to recover Greek terms and breathe new life into them; in fact, it was one of the hallmarks of his philosophy. His revolution of Epistemology originates from his analysis of the Greek word *alētheia*, which is generally translated “truth.” However, the term, according to Heidegger, literally means “unveiling.” As we explained above, the Greek notion of truth was no different than our modern idea, but his probing behind the surface granted him a keen insight into what we *really* mean by truth. While it may appear that Heidegger is reviving a Greek concept, he acknowledges that the notion of *alētheia* (i.e. “truth”)

as an unveiling is *not* Hellenistic. Even the hallowed Greeks themselves missed the mark: “unconcealedness is for thought, the most concealed thing in Greek existence.”<sup>13</sup>

In his essay, *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger observed that while truth had been elevated by philosophers for centuries, paradoxically, it had also devolved into a “worn and almost dulled word.”<sup>14</sup> Truth-as-unveiling, according to Heidegger, provides the foundation for propositional truth, but extends it further. Truth, as unveiling, is an *experience of Being*. For Heidegger that is the essence of truth, for in contemplating beings, we become attuned to *Being itself*. In the *Origin of the Work of Art*, the work of art becomes a vehicle in which we come in contact with Being, and thus art is not *merely aesthetic*, that is to say sensually pleasurable, but something that brings us into communion with Being—an *ontological event*.

If we grant Heidegger the possibility that art is a “happening of truth,” we can foresee that a strictly Aesthetic interpretation of art is insufficient. This radical interpretation of “truth” is ontological truth—truth of Being. Let us now draw an analogy between Heidegger’s Epistemological revolution and his Aesthetic revolution. Propositional truth belongs to the logical realm, but as we have already seen, it has its foundation in the disclosure of beings; to probe beyond the phenomenon reveals that truth is an ontological experience. Similarly, in the field of Aesthetics, it is certain that art pleases the senses, but its effect on the beholder transcends the sensual. Its pleasure, like propositional truth, is dependent on something further. In this way, the overcoming of Aesthetics becomes the next necessary task.

### *Overcoming Aesthetics*

Martin Heidegger, in order to posit an ontological understanding of art, had to dispel the errors in the common understanding of Aesthetics, which is that the work of art is primarily that

which produces sensual pleasure. The word Aesthetics, in fact, came from the Greek *aisthêsis*, which means “sensation.” In direct contradiction to his German, philosophical heritage, Heidegger pronounced that, “much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves.”<sup>15</sup> The perceived object, or the *thing itself*, had been rendered unattainable—illusory even—by Modern philosophers. The Modern account of reality was simply insufficient in describing what human beings actually experience, according to Heidegger. He sought to infuse philosophy again with the common sense that fueled the philosophy of Aristotle; philosophy had too long explained away reality. For a proper understanding of the nature of work of art, Heidegger emphasized that that we *do* in fact encounter *things-in-themselves*, which is where he begins his *Origin of the Work of Art*.

#### *The Work of Art as a Thing*

The most important distinction that Heidegger makes in his *Origin* is the difference between the work of art and an artifact (or piece of equipment). He spends a considerable amount of space at the beginning describing the thingly element of the work of art. The work of art is a *thing*—a rather obvious fact that, according to Heidegger, was consistently overlooked by Aesthetic philosophers. In a direct attack against the majority of philosophical systems since Aristotle, he denounced the doctrine of hylemorphism. This is the matter-form teaching of Aristotle, which states that all physical beings are composed of matter and form. This observation is the foundation of Aristotelian Metaphysics, but, as we have discovered already, Heidegger wished to forge a new era of philosophy independent of Metaphysical notions.

Heidegger considered matter and form, “hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed.”<sup>16</sup> While their purpose was to explain beings, he did not believe the distinction was even well-founded. For Heidegger, the matter-form doctrine is an attack on

the thingly element of being—one of three such assaults. The remaining two are also fundamental to Aristotelian Metaphysics: that an object is a bearer of traits (the doctrine of substance and accident) and that an object is the manifold of sense-perceptions. In all of these mental constructs, according to Heidegger, “the thing vanishes.”<sup>17</sup>

There are a variety of “things” described in the *Origin of the Work of Art*. The first type is the “mere thing,” which is a natural object like wood or stone. This is a *thing* properly speaking. Tools and equipment are similarly called things, but they are not *mere things*, since they are human creations. The work of art, for Heidegger, is closest to a *mere thing*—a counter-intuitive statement, since, like an artifact, the work of art is human-made. In order to understand the work as a *mere thing*, one must “keep at a distance all the preconceptions and assaults” of Metaphysics, and allow the work to “rest in its own self.”<sup>18</sup>

### *The Work as Non-Equipmental*

From the exploration of the “thing” Heidegger moves on to showing that while the work of art is a thing, it is *not* a piece of equipment. Aesthetics had previously imagined that the work of art was matter formed by the intentionality of the artist, but Heidegger did not constrain art to such a Metaphysical interpretation. Ordinarily, he might have made an etymological move at this point to flesh out his distinction between the artifact and the work of art, but unfortunately, just as truth-as-unveiling was a foreign concept to the Greeks, so was the notion that tools and art differ. The Greek language possessed a single word for that which is made by the act of *poiêsis*, whether it was a painting or a hammer: *technê*. Because of the ambiguity in the ancient’s understanding of art, Heidegger had to posit a new distinction that would have been quite foreign to the Greek philosophers.

Heidegger, in order to distinguish between art and artifact, utilized his Phenomenology to penetrate the Greeks' shallow understanding of *things*. *Technitē*, which is the Greek word for a creator, described not what persons *did*, according to Heidegger, but denoted something they *had*; artisans (*technitēs*) are artisans because they possess a mode of knowing, a how-to capacity.<sup>19</sup> For Heidegger, then, the artisan—and the artist—is one *knows how* to bring forth beings out of concealedness.

The artisan and the artist both bring something new into existence. However, the important distinction between them is that while the artist and the artisan both create, the artisan *uses up* the material, and it *vanishes* into utility. For example, an artisan shapes wood and iron, fuses them together, and creates what we call a “hammer.” Wood and iron cease to exist here; there is only a “hammer.” The artist on the other hand utilizes pigment, sound, or stone such that the elements of creation do not disappear like in the hammer, but uniquely shine forth in the work. Color is *most truly* color in a painting; sound is *most-sonorous* in a symphony.

### *The Work Establishing a World*

Art is not static for Heidegger. It is a dynamic being that tells a story; it is an allegory—a symbol.<sup>20</sup> It points beyond itself to the truth of Being. In the case of a painting, it reveals something true about the subject. The work of art manifests what is “recalcitrant, anomalous, and resistant to ordinary understanding.” In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger offers the example of Vincent Van Gogh's painting ‘Peasant Shoes,’ to illustrate this. In this he shows that the essence of the shoes is made present: “The art work let us know what shoes are in truth.”<sup>21</sup>

We have already examined the fault in the Correspondence Theory of Truth, so here we will similarly condemn the popular notion that art is primarily representational. Particularly, in

the wake of modern art, it would be a mistake to claim this. It is clear that art is not simply the reproduction of some *thing* in time, but, as Heidegger posited, the replication of its general essence. The purpose of the work, then, is to provide the occasion for this discovery, since the truth of Being is often concealed by the haze of routine. Art is not beautiful because it is a carbon-copy of reality; this is the most obsolete view of fine art. When in the presence of the work of art, the beholder is transported into a different *world* and given insight into the truth of the being in that world set-up by the work. To put it concisely: “To be a work of art means to set up a world.”<sup>22</sup>

### *Earth: Letting It Be*

Heidegger asserted that the truth which emerges from the work of art presents itself within a struggle between two extremities: Earth and World. This formulation is parallel to his notion of truth in *Being and Time* where he states that, “Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities.”<sup>23</sup> Elaborating on this struggle, which Heidegger calls *Strife*, the Earth is the material out of which the work was created, whereas the World is that which the artist opens up in his creation—both concepts we have previously discussed, yet have just now made explicit. Earth, by nature, is concealing, while the World reveals. Amidst this battle, the work of art provides a Clearing in which Being itself is laid bare. This revelation of Being by means of a particular being is Heidegger’s notion of *truth happening*.

For Heidegger, there are five ways in which *Dasein*, or human nature, discloses itself, and art is one of them. Just as the work of art is a struggle between Earth and World, *Dasein* is similarly situated between two extremes, the Authentic and the Inauthentic, as we discovered before. On a side note, *Strife* is a concept adapted from Heidegger’s reading of Friedrich Hölderlin, whose poetry influenced him to explore the work of art.

### *Art as Historical*

In the *Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger also describes the historical nature of art. In interpreting a work of art, one must not forget the community from which it came: the Renaissance frescos are as much a product of decadent Enlightenment as rock music is a product of our current generation. History does take place in a vacuum, and neither does the work of art come from nowhere. The work of art is not only the product of a people, however. According to Heidegger, the people are a product of the work, too—at least in the case of “Great Art.” The work of art is also the origin of those who *preserve* the work—the entire public to whom the work was endowed.<sup>24</sup> That the work circularly gives birth to a people just as they produce the work itself is a counter-intuitive assertion, but Heidegger maintained that art is a happening of truth that “founds a people,” for artworks are “paradigms of people.”<sup>25</sup> The Preserver, for Heidegger, is crucial to the enduring of the work, since the work of art is essentially communal. Without an audience, there is no art. The art public then is not simply a passive receptor of beauty but an active participant in the work’s unveiling of truth.

### *Art as Language*

Language is insufficient in expressing the complex reality in which we live. It allows us to communicate with one another and to partially express ourselves. Its inherent limitations, however, leave some things unexpressed. Art provides an outlet for those concepts and emotions that exceed the capabilities of verbal language; it becomes an important tool for communication. Rather than simply conveying an idea through a series of conventional symbols, art draws the beholder into another World. According to Heidegger, art provides a Clearing for the revelation

of beings that ordinary human language cannot. “Language,” as he wrote in the *Origin*, “is poetry in the essential sense.”<sup>26</sup>

The creative activity of the poet is a Clearing (*Lichtung*), providing the occasion for unconcealedness.<sup>27</sup> Poetry, therefore, became for Heidegger the quintessential art. This is why he maintained that all of the arts, insofar as they are truth-revealing, are “*essentially* poetry.” The essence of Poetry is the unveiling of beings—an encounter with Being. For Heidegger, all that we call ‘art’ is not even the totality of Poetry. He explains that, “Poetry is thought of here in so broad a sense and at the same time in such intimate unity of being with language and word, that we must leave open whether art, in all its modes from architecture to poesy, exhausts the nature of poetry.”<sup>28</sup>

### *Review*

Before moving on, it might be helpful to remind ourselves what we have discovered so far. First, a work of art is always a *thing*, which much retain its thingly element, for this distinguishes it from equipment. Secondly, this *thing* of which we speak is not simply an object with an additional quality of beauty (that is the Aesthetic perspective), but a work capable of revealing the truth of Being. The work of art, thirdly, does not find its origin in the artist, as once conjectured, but finds a common origin *with* the artist in Art itself.

The work of art, according to Heidegger, is a *letting happen of truth*. This occurs within Strife, which was set into motion by the artist’s establishing of a World. Truth (*alētheia*) for Heidegger is not correctness of a proposition, but the revelation of Being. Truth always emerges out of Strife, and in the work of art, this struggle happens in the dichotomy between Earth and World—the Earth being the material of creation and the World is that which was opened up by the imagination of the artist. Art is essentially communal, and therefore must be shared with an

audience who has the reciprocal responsibility of caring for the work, who Heidegger called Preservers. Finally, insofar as art is the unveiling of beings, Heidegger calls it Poetry. Language for Heidegger is the only way that beings are brought into the light of Being itself, so Poetry represents not only the whole of art, but encapsulates all of language as well.

We are now prepared to delve critically into *The Origin of the Work of Art* with specific attention to the art of music, using the wisdom of other philosophers and the composers of musical works themselves.

## **II. A New Musical Understanding**

Before exploring music as a unique art form, we must first be clear about that which we are about to discuss. In contemporary culture, the most widely disseminated genre of music is song. Song is the musical form of super-imposing lyrics over harmony, and it is the basis of the whole of popular music today. While the significance of “pop” music will be analyzed later, the present argument is only concerned with music properly speaking. Songs are actually a mixed media—combining not only the musical art, but also poetry or in some cases prose. While this coalescing of art forms makes rock music and similar genres arguably more accessible and relevant to the listener, this phenomenon is superfluous to the topic at hand and would be better suited in a paper in which that was the principal subject.

### *The Various Notions Concerning Music*

In the field of “Aesthetics,” for lack of a better term, music is traditionally viewed in one of three ways, which provides the audience with a gauge for the worth of the work.<sup>29</sup> Insofar as the piece is effective in accomplishing the end of each of these perspectives, it is considered a

“good” or “bad” piece of music. The first school is called *Expressionism*, in which music’s primary purpose is to evoke a particular emotion in the listener. Somber music, with minor tonalities and slow tempo, for example, is meant to produce a sad response; an energetic piece, on the other hand, in a major key with a quicker tempo, naturally should arouse a positive, perhaps even joyful response. As a singular interpretation, we have already discussed the shortcomings of this kind of view in relation to the notion that art is a piece of equipment. Music is not merely a means to a desired end. It has value itself, and it reveals far more than its capacity to emote. It is clear, then, as a non-equipmental being, that music does not *solely* evoke an emotional response.

The second school of thought is *Referentialism*, which views music as essentially iconic or *mimetic* (based on the Greek word *mimêsis* meaning imitation). We have similarly discussed this point when we considered the work of art as *not* originating from the artist himself, which this theory presupposes. Also related to this point is the idea (we have already condemned) that art is representational. In our discussion of the World opened up by the work, based on Heidegger’s philosophy, we saw that the painting is not simply a reproduction of reality as the Greeks thought. For a strict Referentialist, the organization of the sound would represent some non-musical entity—a concept or feeling, perhaps. While this is plausible, it, again, does not explain the profundity of an authentic musical experience, so we will again have to probe further to grasp the nature of the musical work.

The final school of thought concerning music is called *Formalism*, which is an entirely cognitive grasp of the composition. As the name suggests, those who ascribe to this perceive music insofar as it adheres to an objective standard of creation admitted by the medium of the work itself. The worth of the piece for a Formalist, in other words, is based on its adherence to

the musical forms (e.g. symphony, song, or etude), dexterity in maneuvering within those forms, and the originality in doing so. This is probably the most difficult understanding of music for our post-modern minds, for we love originality and innovation. This is the embodiment of the Classical ideal, which will also be discussed at greater length. Immanuel Kant, who founded modern Aesthetic philosophy, is the perennial example of an extreme Formalist. In his treatment of the “Aesthetic Ideal” which he presented in *The Critique of Pure Judgment*, he proposed that an objective evaluation of a work’s beauty must be completely detached from emotion.

These three schools are the most prevalent understandings of music as an *Aesthetic* experience. While music naturally admits of all of these various views to an extent, philosophers and musicologists typically emphasize just *one* of them as the proper evaluation of music. If music is primarily expressionistic, the value of a piece is determined by its efficacy in evoking the desired emotion in a particular listener; if music is primarily iconic, then that which best depicts some abstract concept is the most laudable; but, if art is primarily the ascription to a standardized form, then that which best maneuvers within the “rules” of music, without regard to the subjective experience of the listener, is worth the most.

As we have discussed in the previous section, Martin Heidegger, as a philosophical iconoclast, turned the art world upside down with *The Origin of the Work of Art*. He rendered all contemporary conceptions of the work of art, including these views of music just presented, incomplete and shallow. In the process of ascribing an ontological meaning to the work of art, he followed the numerous philosophers before him who did not sufficiently treat music as a particular art form. He exalted poetry in the *Origin* due to his own affinity for the works of Friedrich Hölderlin, but did not properly consider the most ineffable form of art (for why else would philosophers throughout history ignore it?): music. Throughout the ages, music has been

simultaneously the most beloved of arts and the most forgotten in philosophical discussion regarding art.

### *Distinguishing the Arts*

According to Heidegger, works of art are firstly *things*. Paintings hang in museums, while sculptures are perched on their bases; poems are compiled into volumes in libraries, while musical scores are stacked, as Heidegger described “in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar.”<sup>30</sup> While this seems incontestable, namely that a produced work must always be a *thing*, this particular example first reveals Heidegger’s misunderstanding of music. Because of poetic bias, he did not separate the arts into two separate categories as the ancient Greeks themselves did according to their gods. In so neglecting to parse and examine the individual media involved in original human creation, he missed the important distinctions between the various arts, including the fundamental difference between music and the other arts.

The first distinction must be drawn between the “plastic arts” (which will henceforth be used as a generic term for the combined arts of painting and sculpture) and poetry or music. This distinction goes back all the way to the Ancient Greek deities, Apollo and Dionysius, who were the gods of the “plastic arts” and music respectively. While the plastic arts were viewed as more dignified and solemn through the stately personage of Apollo, music’s god, Dionysius, was an inebriated reveler whose joyful demeanor expressed the freedom and emotional excess of the spirit of music.

### *Musical Thingness*

Returning to Heidegger’s description of the objects of art, we might, at first glance, take for granted his depiction of the poem and the musical work in the above paragraph. “Yes,” we would say, “it is clear that every piece of art is also a tenable object.” In that affirmation,

however, would be our first mistake. While paintings, sculpture, and architecture are spatial works of art, music and poetry do not occupy *space*, properly speaking. The combination of color and shape on a canvas *is* the painting, but the arrangement of notes on a staff or printed words of a poem is *not* music or poetry, for the nature of those art forms is *sound*. The written word is not language properly speaking, but simply the dictation of the spoken word (i.e. language proper). In the same way, a musical score is only *potential* music, not yet actualized, for it can only properly be called “music” in the sounding performance.

A poem is an auditory experience—a vocal art form. Even if one silently reads a poem, he still “reads aloud” the words in his mind, imitating the sounds learned in his youth as if he were physically hearing it. Many musicians can similarly “hear” a piece of music, even without ever having heard it before simply by analyzing the score. This is a learned ability, of course, just like learning a language. The musician, like the reader, replicates sound in his head, since one essentially “reads” what is on a musical score—his is simply a different language. Music, like poetry, is a wholly auditory art form. Thus, music and poetry distinguish themselves from *spatial* plastic arts and are revealed to be *temporal* art forms.

### *Memory*

In our description of poetry, we came across the example of someone reading poetry, while his mind mimicked the audio as if it were being read aloud. This replication of sense impressions is how our memory works generally, as well. Often when we remember some physical body, we “picture” it in our minds. Similarly, with music our minds have the ability to recall a melody without sheet of music or an auditory stimulus. Our mind—especially in relation to the phenomenon of memory—works on levels only partially understood by modern science.

Bringing it up in our discussion of art has the potential to confuse, but we have to understand that memory is simply one's reflection on an already perceived reality; one cannot think what one has not seen or heard. The recalling of a musical tune is *not* music, neither is the musical score—although, Mozart's manuscripts *do* make beautiful visual art. But, once the thinker becomes the *performer*, the instant the vibration of vocal chords causes sound waves to touch the air at a sustained and determined frequency, music is born, and we again have something to talk about.

### *Music as Temporal*

Let us now explore what is meant by the expression “temporal art.” It is evident that when talking about music, we not only designate the musical performance “music,” but also the tangible, paper score, and in modern times, its electronic reproduction either on the computer or in some other recorded medium (e.g. a CD). However, the latter two uses of the word “music” are analogous in relation to music proper. Neither the printed orchestral score, nor the space a piece takes up on one's hard drive is actually “music.” Music exists only in the sounding experience—the performance. The musical score simply directs the players in performing what the composer intended, and the recording is just the reproduction of that performance. The distinction between the musical score and the musical performance is clearly seen in the compositions of many Serialist composers of the early twentieth-century whose aleatoric pieces often abandoned “traditional” notation techniques, in favor of new methods of notation that were more suited for their non-conventional works.

Music, viewed in this way, seems to have a different sort of “thingly” element than the other modes of art—something Heidegger fails to address in the *Origin*. Perhaps he thought that the sound waves produced by the vibrating musical instruments somehow constituted the thingly

element or maybe the sound itself. When discussing the different art forms, he offers the example of the woodenness of a carving or the color of a painting. When considering music, however, there seems to be something artificial about his description of its “sonority” (is that equivalent to being soundy?). If a thingly element is indeed at work in the musical composition, it must be something entirely different than that of the spatial arts.

*Music and its Illusive World*

While still unsure what exactly constitutes the thingly element in music (i.e. the Earth) in Heidegger’s *Origin of the Work of Art*, the World of the musical composition is similarly enigmatic. Heidegger states that, “art makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory.”<sup>31</sup> To illustrate this setting up of a World, Heidegger used Van Gogh’s “Peasant Shoes.” In this painting, says Heidegger, the artist opened up the World in which the shoes exist (whether in actuality or only in the imagination) and reveals their true essence.

In the art of painting and the other visual arts it is understandable that the predominant Aesthetic theory was Referential. In the example of Van Gogh’s painting, the subject matter, namely the shoes, is revealed. (Whether or not these particular shoes actually exist or not is beside the point, for we all have seen shoes and can easily imagine such a pair in reality.) In painting, sculpture, and even to some extent poetry, the work of art is often representational—even if the sole aim of the work is not the correspondence to some real being. In music, however, the subject matter is more elusive; music admits no antecedent subject or reproduction of some physical being. While the painter might depict a sunrise, the subject matter of the composer has always confounded the thinker. Albert Einstein, a musician himself, eloquently stated that “in music, fortunately, there can be no question of imitating nature; music is

autonomous; belonging to another intellectual world, another sphere of imagination than all the other arts.”<sup>32</sup> This other world is a further level of abstraction and therefore part of a more transcendent activity of the human being in relation to nature and his human community.

Some maintain that the subject of music is the emotion of the composer, which provides him with the material for his musical compositions. Even if that were the case, the subject would still be more enigmatic than that of the painter. It seems more likely that the affectations of the composer simply provide a condition for a genre of work relative to the composer himself. As a mode of expression, art is always relative to the artist and his generation, for what is seen as angst in one era might be perceived as joy in another, even if generalizations can sometimes be made. Even the mode of artistry is dependent on the comfortability and familiarity that the artist has with a particular medium.

#### *Versus the Romantic Ideal: The Early Twentieth-Century*

In opposition to the idea that musical inspiration proceeds primarily from the emotional cache of the composer, we have to examine the history of music itself. To view music as only an outlet of emotion is to commit a grave injustice to all musical literature prior to the nineteenth-century and the vast majority of pieces written since the early twentieth-century. Music as an expressive medium of the artist was not a prevalent concept until the Romantic era, which found its genesis in composers like Ludwig van Beethoven. In our contemporary culture, many composers have made a name for themselves based on an intentional disregard of the Romantic Ideal, even while the general public still clings to this Referentialist point of view. The Serialists of the early twentieth-century were frontrunners in this protest. In their music they deliberately abandoned preconceived ideas about form, linearity, and tonality—even what constituted a

“musical instrument.” In 1949, Aaron Copland defended the innovative compositions of his contemporaries in an interview to the *New York Times*: “when a contemporary piece seems dry and cerebral to you, when it seems to be giving off little feeling or sentiment, there is a good chance that you are not willing to live in your own epoch, musically speaking.”<sup>33</sup>

There are an unlimited variety of cases in which the impetus to create is non-emotional. For example, think of any commissioned piece of music for which the composer is paid to write. The musical inspiration in a commission is not often born of the free expression of the artist, but out of the necessity to please his patron. Film scores are another example of music that is not inspired by the emotional expression of the composer alone. While the subject matter in these cases is determined by sources outside of the composer, the result is still music. Most of the greatest works of art in history were commissioned pieces in which the artist remained within explicit guidelines and restrictions. Because of our exaltation of the “song” in contemporary music, we have confined music to Referentialism and Romanticism, since the lyrics often express the innermost thoughts of the writer. The song, however, does not represent the totality of music, for it is just one musical form. It just happens to be this generation’s standard for musical authenticity—like the symphony in prior ages.

Igor Stravinsky, like Copland, also took up his “cudgel” in 1939 against the music critics in his *Poetics of Music*, in which he defended so-called “atonality.” He expressed his distaste for what he referred to as the “spell of the Romantic approach.”<sup>34</sup> He also condemned the new wave of Neo-Classicalists, which he characterized as the “Tyranny of the Wagnerian System.” Richard Wagner is historically known for his popular, yet bombastic musical dramas. At one time, he was good friends with Friedrich Nietzsche, but Wagner’s conversion to Christianity, as well as Nietzsche’s own ideological shift, caused an irreparable rift between the men. Nietzsche from

then on referenced his former friend as the epitome of what went wrong in contemporary music, even devoting an entire book, *Contra Wagner*, to explaining how he failed to be the musical savior of the German opera scene that Nietzsche had hoped for.

The unique nature of the musical art form suggests that it relies less on physical bodies than any other art; it is above all an indication of music's transcendence. The World and the Earth, of which we sought to further Heidegger's thesis, have proved elusive. As Heidegger argued in the *Origin*, "the more solitarily the work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and the more cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply does the thrust come into the Open."<sup>35</sup> This apparent transcendence of physical reality, exceeding that of the other arts, positions music above the other art forms—as Einstein pointed out, music is in its own league.

### *The Ineffability of Music*

It has been shown that both the Earth and World of the musical work are more concealed than in all of the other arts. It seems that this fact has never been lost on the philosopher who was actually brave enough to give an account of the essence of art. Throughout the history of Aesthetic philosophy, music's particular ineffability has always proved incomprehensible. In Martin Heidegger's *The Origin of the Work of Art*, an essay on art in general, he lacked the particular musical examples to uphold his thesis. In grouping the different arts under the umbrella of Poetry, he ignored the ancient distinction between music and the plastic arts. His inability to treat music as a particular art form is a testament to its transient and enigmatic nature, since it seems that he was as unable to account for the musical experience as the myriad of philosophers before him. This incomprehensibility suggests that music, according to

Heidegger's own understanding of the work, would provide the occasion for a *more profound* revelation of Being.

### *The Musical Audience*

The inspiration (or subject matter) of the composer, as we have previously discussed, is generally more enigmatic than that of the painter, poet, or sculptor. This further separates him from Heidegger's "Preservers," or as they are usually called, his audience. In his book *The Infinite Variety of Music*, Leonard Bernstein described this divide as the "famous gulf between composer and audience," which has not only in recent years widened, but has evolved into an ocean, making enemies of the two.<sup>36</sup> The era of the Serialists—which arguably caused the greatest rift between the innovative composer and his Romantic listeners—is now history. The last thirty or forty years have seen a reemergence of tonality, linearity, and form in orchestral music that is proving to be more pleasing to the audience (e.g. Post-Serialism, Minimalism, or Post-Classicism). While current musical trends have resurrected these once reviled techniques, the Romantic Ideal has perhaps been suppressed forever in the mind of the composer, even as the audience still asserts its preeminence. For this reason the audience and the current composer are still in conflict, just as the contemporary visual artist is sometimes mocked by the general public.

### *The Musical Performance*

Music is a unique art form for yet another peculiar reason, based on its temporality: the work must always be *performed*. Music is the communal art *par excellence* because there are always a greater number of people participating in the experience than in the other arts. The composer is more removed from his audience by the sheer fact that most compositions require an *ensemble* to actualize them—it almost always comes mediated by a group of additional persons.

This adds another layer to the profundity of the musical composition. With the various spatial arts, the thingly element, as discussed above, is stagnant in one manner of speaking, since once the work is completed it remains *complete*. Music, however, needs to be *continually recreated* based on the plans of the composer. The necessary interpretation of the musical composition by various generations, keeps the work fresh and relevant; it is able to endure time because of this *atemporal* intimacy.

This *atemporality* of music does not negate its *temporal* nature, which we discussed in relation to its non-*spatial* quality. Its *atemporality* is in relation to its timelessness, universality, and endurance through the ages. Because the work must be created anew each time it is heard, there is an intimacy with the art that is not present in a painting or sculpture. I cannot know the composer of *Don Giovanni*, but I can experience the opera in a way that is more profound than visiting an art gallery. In the musical experience, the art is *happening now* in front of me, whereas the museum displays works that are once-and-forever completed. Thus, in music, the task of the Preservers, as illustrated in Heidegger's *Origin*, becomes crucial to the legacy of the musical work. Without musicians and performers, the musical work does not simply decay, as in the case of a painting or sculpture, but ceases to exist entirely; every generation must preserve the work, or it is lost forever.

#### *Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Music*

The unique nature of music in comparison to the other arts for the reasons already provided. Why then did Martin Heidegger not treat music with the care required to validate his claims? Perhaps it would have been more suitable for his overall project to have seriously considered Friedrich Nietzsche's emphasis on music, which for Nietzsche was much more than just a clever literary device. Nietzsche's philosophy depended on the pivotal distinction between

the Apollonian and Dionysian gods, which were explained in the beginning of this essay. He described his philosophy as having a Dionysian character. He saw vitality and life in the emotional excess and ecstasy of Dionysius and wished to infuse all of his works with musical allusions and sincerity. His affinity for music led him to proclaim that “without music, life would be an error.”<sup>37</sup>

Perhaps Nietzsche was on to something when he posited the primacy of music over the other arts, a position that Heidegger undoubtedly gleaned from Nietzsche yet did not agree with. Regarding this notion, Friedrich Nietzsche calls music “the *universal-unnational-atemporal* art”—the, “*only flourishing* art. It represents for us art *as a whole* and the artistic world.”<sup>38</sup> In contrast to his predecessor, Heidegger envisioned *poetry* as the whole of the art world. His poetical bias seems to stem from his affinity for Hölderlin’s poems, from which he drew much philosophical inspiration. The title of his work, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, is even derived from a work of Hölderlin’s called “The Journey.” So, it seems the influence of this German nationalist trumped that of his philosophical predecessor, Friedrich Nietzsche. Like most philosophers, Heidegger was utterly unfamiliar with music. Nietzsche and Einstein, on the other hand, were both musicians—to some extent composers themselves, even—and so were more attuned to the ineffable world of music

### *Musical Inspiration: Stravinsky and Heidegger*

We have already discussed at length that, according to Martin Heidegger, the artist is not the sole originator of the work of art, but rather from Art itself instigates both the artist and the work of art. We have also explored the false doctrines of Aesthetics. But, while we *have* negated some potential possibilities as to what causes the artist to create, we have not spoken

much about the phenomenon of musical *inspiration*. The idea posited by Heidegger that Art itself spurs the artist to initiate some creative expression seems to account better for the musical inspiration that most composers experience. The artist often has an experience, whether an event or a feeling, that produces an irresistible urge to create. Artistic inspiration is more complicated than sheer emotional catharsis as some would maintain. It is a compulsion—for a few, an obsession—which is only appeased through the act of creation.

Igor Stravinsky described his inspirational muse as, “the voice that commands [him] to create.”<sup>39</sup> Perhaps Heidegger’s account of the origin of the work best captures the childhood genius of composers like Mozart, who at an early age seemed almost possessed by a supernatural force, rather than having possessed some well-honed ability. So, what is a composer: possessor or possessed? Artistic inspiration, at any rate, is an enigma that can only be described vaguely because of the impotence of language. Furthermore it is a topic proper only for those who have experienced it—the composer and *not* the ignorant philosopher—like any profound, personal experience. Whether it is Art itself, as Heidegger maintained, that sets the creative mind in motion or something else, words will never be able to capture its essence, for that is the reason that art is necessary in communicating where language leaves off.

Stravinsky eloquently described the composer as a seeker. He wrote that “All creation presupposes at its origin a sort of appetite that is brought on by the foretaste of discovery.”<sup>40</sup> In Stravinsky’s mind musical inspiration is an impulse to *discover* in the process of creating, and then, to ultimately share the discovery with a community. This discovery is the happening of truth, Heidegger’s unveiling of Being (*alêtheia*). Considering the artist in this way—as the instrument of truth—is in harmony with Nietzsche’s assertion that the “true artist” is simultaneously, “musician, poet, [and] thinker.”<sup>41</sup>

### III. The Future Possibility of Music

When the lectures that would become *The Origin of the Work of Art* were first presented in the late thirties, Martin Heidegger had not yet experienced the expanding global economy that he later pondered in the *Question Concerning Technology* (1979). Today, we live in a world where information is literally at our fingertips and cultural identities are melding into one another. Tradition and culture are being replaced in our bustling, pragmatic world. Music is no longer written for a particular people as it once was because, with advancing technologies, music has become the most easily distributed art form in our contemporary society; the *world* is now the composer's target audience. Heidegger questioned the future of art in the *Origin*, but his lament seemed premature. He posed the question like this: "is art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character?"<sup>42</sup> Heidegger wondered whether art had once-and-for-all devolved in the wake of modernity. Is its significance the same, or has it changed in some way? Will "Great Art," as Hegel called it, ever again be possible?

Leonard Bernstein wrote the following lines in 1966: "Everyone says that this is a critical moment in the history of music. I agree, but double is spades: it is a *scary* moment."<sup>43</sup> Music—and art generally speaking—seems to function differently in our lives than in previous generations. Maybe at one time art *did* found a people, as Heidegger claimed, but that does not seem to be the case today. Art for its own sake seems extinct. The vast majority of "artworks," today, are used for something else. Music is prominent in commercials and movies, while graphic art is used to decorate the side of a bus more often than it is displayed in a museum. Architecture, for example, has almost entirely become extinct as an art, in the wake of practical concerns for modern buildings. One simply has to observe the quickly-constructed

“subdivision” of suburbia to witness a complete disregard for beauty in construction, which is architecture. We rarely take pride in making something beautiful anymore, for beauty takes time, and time is money. In general, art for the sake of art is extinct, and art for the sake of something else is vogue. It is a reflection of our pragmatic mindset.

### *Tradition and Culture*

We are currently experiencing a strange and uniquely post-modern phenomenon, which manifests itself in nearly every aspect of our contemporary lives: we are *out of touch* with our past. Because of this, we feel that we are simply *observers* in the continuum of history. History seems to be that which happened to someone else, while our task, as ahistorical men, is to learn about history, reconstruct it—*anything* but live it! “Great Art” is similarly viewed as something of the past, which seems to be the reason that contemporary art has often devolved into a means of personal or political activism. It is hard for most people to call an accumulation of artifacts with a message “art,” but those sort of confusing displays are everywhere in the art world. When one has estranged himself from his position in history, “tradition” becomes a set of rules to follow, rather than a living force that infuses the present reality with meaning. Culture, then, is an archaic construct of the past for those who did not have the luxury of globalization. It is as if we are cut off from reality in contemporary society—*numb* to life. This is the artistic context of our generation: we are anesthetized. And, we are anesthetized because we experience *too much*.

### *Artistic Saturation*

It is not the case that art simply does not exist in our present society. On the contrary, there are more media and artists than ever before. The difficulty is that there is an *artistic*

*saturation*; there is *too much* art. Art is everywhere and instantly accessible. The worldwide web allows every work of art ever created to be viewed immediately, on-demand. To have an artistic experience, one need not be bothered by attending a museum or a concert anymore, even though some still do. Music, for example, is downloadable from all over the world and is ever-present because of television, movies, and portable mp3 players.

The value of art is diminished in this artistic saturation. The bottom line is that art's worth is declining with each generation because its acquisition is easy—*too* easy, perhaps. This is not to say that we must regress and return to an era that appreciated art but had not yet discovered electricity. It is simply an observation which is the foundation for the question: what is the future of art? Who knows what music will sound like by the end of the twenty-first-century? There has been more radical contrast in music in the last one-hundred years than in the four-hundred years that preceded them, and this trend does not seem to be slowing. Just consider the radical difference between Beethoven's 'Moonlight Sonata' and what is heard on top 40 stations today. With the advent of technology, which becomes more reliable every day, society evolves exponentially. Perhaps this alarming progress prevents us from making conjectures about the future of music... maybe not.

### *The Enduring Melody*

While art for its own sake is nearing extinction, let us suppose for a moment that music is actually surviving amidst the dying field of art. Unlike the snobbery that often fills the museum, music's audience is more diverse and numerous, in part because of the evolution of the song and its wide-variety of genres. When words intertwine with melody, the resulting unity penetrates the soul more profoundly than either medium singularly. Had the song not evolved in the course

of music history, the future of music might have been more bleak, but at this point in time, music remains the most relevant and accessible art—one that continues to inspire and unite people throughout the world.

### *A Bittersweet Phenomenon*

The personal music device (e.g. iPods and CD players) allows music to travel with the listener, which is a novel experience of the last twenty years. But one has to wonder if this is a positive development. This is the immediate question that comes to mind: is music being appreciated as an art, or has it simply become the background noise to human experience? Often, it seems that the “iPod” is that which protects us from silence, which is the enemy of a bustling people. The hum of the computer even convinces us that we are not alone. Art for the sake of distraction, even if it is available to millions, might even be worse than art that is simply unappreciated—although, it *is* art, and it *does* endure. Igor Stravinsky struggled with this potentially bleak prognosis in his *Poetics of Music*, but, he refused to be discouraged.

### *Finale*

Another sad reality of our world is that we are not only disconnected from our *past*, but we are also isolated from the people who constitute our *present*. The days when neighbors helped to raise children are long gone, for in the “Global Village” everyone fends for himself. While we become increasingly individualized in most areas of our lives, Stravinsky envisioned music as a great unifying force—the means to retaining our *humanity* in our post-modern world:

For the unity of the work has a resonance all its own. Its echo, caught by our soul, sounds nearer and nearer. Thus the consummated work spreads abroad to be communicated and finally flows back towards its source. The cycle, then, is closed. And that is how music comes to reveal itself as a form of communion with our fellow man—and with the Supreme Being.<sup>44</sup>

While the soundtrack of human history will eventually fade out, it is unclear what that finale will look—or sound—like. Perhaps music is, as Stravinsky claimed, that which will bind humanity through the ages; maybe it is also the force that will again reconnect us to our Source. For now, our inquiry into the nature of music and art is complete; the journey has come full circle. After a thorough exploration of the nature of music, I will end our discussion in the same manner as Martin Heidegger in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, with a quote from Hölderlin's "The Journey": "Reluctantly, that which dwells near its origin departs."<sup>45</sup>

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- <sup>1</sup> Walter Kaufman, *Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: Penguin Group, 1956; Plume, 1975), 11.
- <sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Being and Time: Introduction" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. John Stambaugh and J. Glenn Gray (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 85.
- <sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology" in *Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Penguin Group, 1956; Plume, 1975), 234-41.
- <sup>4</sup> Simon Blackburn, *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), s.v. "Heidegger, Martin," 170.
- <sup>5</sup> Karsten Harries, "Heidegger, Martin: Heidegger's Confrontation with Aesthetics" in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol. 3* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 377.
- <sup>6</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, trans. John W. Stanley (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 98.
- <sup>7</sup> Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 18.
- <sup>8</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Birth of Tragedy" in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 52.
- <sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Philosophies of Art & Beauty: Selected Reading in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger*, ed. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 651.
- <sup>10</sup> Ruben Berrios and Aaron Ridley, "Nietzsche" in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2001), 78.
- <sup>11</sup> *Origin*, 692.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 702.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 678.
- <sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. by John Sallis (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 116.
- <sup>15</sup> *Origin*, 657.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 658.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 657.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 662.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 684.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 652.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 665.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 672.
- <sup>23</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 265.
- <sup>24</sup> *Origin*, 699.
- <sup>25</sup> Taylor Carman, "Heidegger, Martin: Survey of Thought" in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol. 3* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 373.
- <sup>26</sup> *Origin*, 696.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 695.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 696.
- <sup>29</sup> Mark Debillis, "Music" in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2001), 531.
- <sup>30</sup> *Origin*, 652.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>32</sup> Einstein, Albert, *Essays on Music* (New York: WW Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), 7.
- <sup>33</sup> Josiah Fisk, ed., *Composers on Music: Eight Centuries of Writings, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 344.
- <sup>34</sup> Igor Stravinsky, *Poetics of Music: In the Form of Six Lessons*, trans. Arthur Knodel and Ingolf Dahl (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 58.
- <sup>35</sup> *Origin*, 690.
- <sup>36</sup> *Composers on Music*, 399.
- <sup>37</sup> Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, trans. David Pellauer and Graham Parkes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 8.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.
- <sup>39</sup> *Poetics of Music*, 65.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.
- <sup>41</sup> *Nietzsche and Music*, 35.
- <sup>42</sup> *Origin*, 701.
- <sup>43</sup> *Composers on Music*, 399.
- <sup>44</sup> *Poetics of Music*, 80.
- <sup>45</sup> *Origin.*, 700.